Polling around the Trump-Xi summit shows a public skeptical of Beijing but evenly split between competition and cooperation, and doubtful the meeting would reshape relations.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Beijing on May 14-15, 2026, marking Trump’s first visit to China since 2017. Operating under a framework of “constructive strategic stability,” official readouts from both governments unveiled new mechanisms to manage economic ties, including plans to establish a bilateral “Board of Trade” and “Board of Investment.”
While these announcements signaled a desire to stabilize ties, each side emphasized different priorities. The Chinese readout highlighted reciprocal market-access commitments and called Taiwan the most important issue in bilateral relations. The U.S. summary, in comparison, focused on potential purchases of Boeing aircraft as well as farm products, and stressed cooperation on trade and Middle East security. Analysts observed that the meeting, labelled by some as a “stalemate summit,” offered little detail on breakthroughs and was seen more as a step to maintain dialogue than to resolve core disputes.
A new PAX sapiens survey of 1,047 U.S. adults, fielded by NORC at the University of Chicago between May 14-18, 2026, helps contextualize these developments by mapping American attitudes.
Overall sentiment toward China remains wary. Impressions of the country run net negative, with 43% unfavorable to 24% favorable, though a striking one-third say they don’t know enough to judge.
On China’s role in the world, a majority (59%) sees it as causing global problems rather than providing solutions. However, only 14% call China mostly an “enemy” of the United States. Far more settle on “competitor” (34%) or “both partner and competitor” (31%).
This wariness does not produce a clear strategic preference. Asked whether the U.S. should act competitively or cooperatively toward China, the public splits almost exactly in half — a 50/50 statistical tie.
Asked how the Trump-Xi summit would affect U.S.-China relations, about two-thirds pointed to little changing. Specifically, 36% said this visit would only temporarily ease tensions and 29% saw little real effect, against 24% who thought it would improve relations and 12% who thought it would make things worse.
Taken together, there is no public mandate pulling China policy in either direction. Americans are skeptical of China but not seeking confrontation, and they are evenly divided on the competitive-versus-cooperative choice that drives most strategy debates. Moreover, the public sets a low ceiling on summit diplomacy. A stabilizing, incremental meeting of the kind that occurred is the outcome most Americans already saw coming. That gives policymakers room to pursue pragmatic, managed competition without getting ahead of public opinion, but little settled consensus to lean on when harder choices arise.
Survey of 1,047 U.S. adults (1,000 via the web and 47 by telephone) conducted by NORC at the University of Chicago using its probability-based AmeriSpeak Omnibus®, May 14–18, 2026. Results weighted to national benchmarks. Margin of sampling error ±3.9 percentage points.
